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This paper constructs measures of the extent of ballot stuffing (fraudulent votes) and electoral coercion
at the municipal level using data from Colombia's 1922 Presidential elections. Our main findings are
that the presence of the state reduced the extent of ballot stuffing, but that of the clergy, which was
closely imbricated in partisan politics, increased coercion. We also show that landed elites to some
extent substituted for the absence of the state and managed to reduce the extent of fraud where they
were strong. At the same time, in places which were completely out of the sphere of the state, and
thus partisan politics, both ballot stuffing and coercion were relatively low. Thus the relationship between
state presence and fraud is not monotonic.
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1 Introduction
The preponderance of the literature on democracy has focused on the origins and timing
of the introduction of universal su⁄rage (e.g., Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992,
Collier, 1999, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). While this approach is surely justi￿ed in many
cases, it also leaves aside many puzzles. For instance, Argentina had universal male su⁄rage
after the promulgation of the 1853 constitution, as did Mexico after its 1857 constitution,
but neither country is typically counted as a democracy in the 19th century. In fact, the
standard date for the introduction of democracy in Argentina is the passing of the Saenz
Peæa Law in 1914 whose main aim was to eliminate electoral corruption and fraud, things
which had previously negated the e⁄ects of universal male su⁄rage. This law had profound
consequences, destabilizing the political status quo and allowing the Radical Party to assume
power, a process ultimately leading to the coup of 1930 (Smith, 1978). This example, and
others like it, such as the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1957 (Baland and
Robinson, 2008), suggest that the consequences of variation in electoral fraud are possibly
as large as that of the variation in the formal institutions of democracy.
Despite the importance of electoral fraud, it has been little studied, possibly because
it is so di¢ cult to measure and quantify. In consequence, we have little idea about what
causes variation in the extent or incidence of such fraud. Moreover, there are many ways to
undermine the true outcome of elections ranging from vote buying through disenfranchising
potential voters, to using coercion to keep voters away, coercion to force voters to vote in
particular ways, or creating fraudulent ballots (￿ ballot stu¢ ng￿ ) in favor of one candidate.
This lack of systematic evidence and the complexity of the underlying phenomenon makes
it di¢ cult to understand the determinants and implications of fraud.
In this paper we use two unique data sources from the 1922 Colombian presidential
election to examine electoral fraud. First, we are able to construct a (necessarily imperfect)
measure of the extent of fraudulent voting or ￿ ballot stu¢ ng￿at the municipal level. We do
this by combining data collected on the vote totals reported by municipal electoral boards
1￿What the conservatives won with arms cannot be taken away by a few slips of paper.￿El Espectador,
February 10, 1922, quoted on Blanco, Solano, and Rodr￿guez, 1922, p. 306.
1(Jurados Electorales) to the central government with estimates of the maximum potential
franchise from the 1918 population census. This gives us at least a lower bound on the extent
of ballot stu¢ ng. For 508 out of the total 755 municipalities of Colombia for which we have
data we ￿nd the reported vote totals to be larger than the maximum number of people who
could possibly have voted. In such municipalities there was obvious ballot stu¢ ng, and this
was consequential. The ratio of stu⁄ed ballots to total votes is very large, reaching over 35%
on average. Indeed, according to this methodology the total number of stu⁄ed ballots was
230,007, which was larger than the winning margin of 188,502 by which the Conservative
candidate Pedro Nel Ospina defeated the Liberal loser Benjam￿n Herrera.
Table 1 shows some of the basic data from this exercise by Colombian department. One
can see here that there is a lot of variation. For instance in Antioquia, traditionally a bastion
of the Conservative party, the total number of votes cast was 76,420 of which we calculate
11,658 were fraudulent. On the other hand, in the Liberal stronghold of Santander, of the
55,492 votes ￿ cast￿almost 24,000 were fake, a far greater proportion. Generally, ballot stu¢ ng
is larger in the eastern Andean region (BoyacÆ, Cundinamarca, and the Santanderes) as well
as in the Coast (Bolivar and Magdalena).
Second, we use various sources of information, particularly the proceedings of a conference
held in the Colombian city of IbaguØ after the election, to code a variable measuring incidents
of electoral violence or coercion (Blanco et al, 1922). This conference, held by the Liberal
party in the wake of the 1922 election, contains numerous accounts of both ballot stu¢ ng,
fraud, and coercion.
We then study some of the potential sources of variation in ballot stu¢ ng and coercion
across municipalities. To form hypotheses about this it is useful to have in mind a simple
￿ model￿of political con￿ icts and institutions in Colombia in the 1920s. Colombian politics
since the 1850s had been characterized by intense con￿ ict between the Liberal and Conser-
vative parties, who contested elections and fought wars. Con￿ ict revolved around several
key issues, such as the power of the central state and the in￿ uence of the church, with the
Catholic hierarchy being closely intertwined with the Conservative party. Con￿ ict was not
primarily about economic issues, however, and traditional economic elites were not predom-
inantly aligned with either party (Sa⁄ord, 1972, Delpar, 1981) and seem to have mostly
opposed the partisan struggles because of the chaos and disruption they caused. All types
of con￿ ict, electoral and otherwise, took place in the shadow of state weakness to the extent
that some parts of the country were almost autonomous of the central state - so called ￿ inde-
2pendent republics.￿Even though the Conservatives maintained control of the state between
1885 and 1930, after an intense civil war between 1899 and 1902 (the ￿War of a Thousand
Days￿ ), the parties innovated institutions to mitigate the propensity for con￿ ict (Mazzuca
and Robinson, 2009). Speci￿cally, they moved towards a system of institutionalized power
sharing that was speci￿cally ￿ fraud proof,￿in that for legislative elections it gave 2/3 of the
representation to the Conservatives and 1/3 to the Liberals. It left presidential elections
open, however, though the Conservatives also passed a law speci￿cally disenfranchising mu-
nicipalities where the recorded number of votes was more than 1/3 of the total population.
These laws were passed by political elites at the center because the weakness of the state
and the parties made it di¢ cult for them to discipline their own supporters in the peripheral
parts of the country.
What does this ￿ model￿suggest about some determinants of ballot stu¢ ng and coercion?
First, the attempts by central political elites to pass laws attempting to o⁄set their lack
of control of the periphery leads us to hypothesize that the state was not partisan but in
fact ￿ Weberian,￿in the sense that the greater presence of state o¢ cials would tend to reduce
the amount of ballot stu¢ ng and coercion. However, to the extent that some areas of the
country were so autonomous that they were outside the scope of party politics, there could
be a non-monotonic relationship between state presence and fraud. Those who controlled
the ￿independent republics￿could not be disciplined by state o¢ cials, but neither were they
integrated into party political con￿ icts.
Second, our account also leads us to hypothesize that ballot stu¢ ng and coercion would
be negatively correlated with the power of traditional economic (landed) elites. Landed elites
opposed the disorder that historical sources suggest accompanied and facilitated fraud.
Finally, it is clear from the historical evidence that most fraud was perpetrated by the
incumbent Conservative party. Given the electoral rules, coercion, to the extent it was
practised, would be focused on stopping Liberals voting, and we would expect to ￿nd this
coercion positively correlated with the presence of Catholic priests.
Using a variety of sources, we are able to investigate whether the variation in ballot
stu¢ ng and coercion is consistent with these ideas.2 First, for the whole of Colombia, we
￿nd that the presence of the state is negatively correlated with the extent of ballot stu¢ ng,
though uncorrelated with coercion. In municipalities where there was a greater presence of
2Though we are not able to make strong claims about causality, we do uncover some very robust condi-
tional correlations.
3the army or more government bureaucrats, ballot stu¢ ng was less. In addition, the presence
of Catholic priests is positively correlated with coercion but negatively correlated with ballot
stu¢ ng.
Second, focusing on the important department of Cundinamarca for which we have much
richer data, in addition to the above results, we ￿nd that ballot stu¢ ng is negatively corre-
lated with land inequality and the extent to which local politics is monopolized by individuals
(which we refer to as ￿ political concentration￿ ). We also ￿nd that political concentration is
signi￿cantly negatively correlated with electoral coercion.
These ￿ndings are very consistent with our hypotheses. First, they suggest that the
Colombian state in 1922 was not partisan, but in fact rather ￿ Weberian￿and attempted to
control electoral fraud when it could. Unfortunately, however, its reach was limited.
Second, priests played an important role in coercion of Liberal voters and this coercion
was aimed primarily at stopping them voting. In section 3 of the paper we present a simple
model of how this ￿nding can be consistent with the fact that the number of priests in a
municipality is negatively correlated with the extent of ballot stu¢ ng. This follows because
even if priests kept Liberals from the polls, the number of priests would naturally be positively
correlated with the number of Conservative voters in a municipality, which would give less
￿ room￿for ballot stu¢ ng.
Third, the fact that in Cundinamarca we ￿nd less ballot stu¢ ng where land inequality is
high is consistent with the hypothesis that traditional elites disliked fraud. It was precisely
the core areas of the department with a strong consolidated landed elite ￿dating back to
the colonial period in some cases ￿that had high levels of land inequality.
Finally, areas where political concentration was high featured less ballot stu¢ ng and
coercion because such concentration was a feature of ￿ independent republics,￿which were to
a large extent outside the control and circuit of Conservative politicians. In these areas there
was no major contribution to the incumbent (Conservative) cause one way or another.
Though these ￿ndings about the political role of the Catholic Church may be surprising
to some, they are in line with a rich historical literature on Colombia. For instance, Deas
observes ￿the church was the electoral arm of the Conservatives. Liberalism was a sin:
Colombian sermons were intense and obstinate on this point￿(Deas, 1993, p. 210; see also
Deas, 1996, Medina, 1991, and Posada-Carb￿, 1995, p. 10).3
3For the purposes of this research we take the political preference of Catholic priests for the Conservative
party as given. The church does not seem to have seriously considered altering its allegiances during this
period (see the analysis of Warner, 2000, for post World War II Italy, France and Germany, or Gill￿ s, 1998,
4Our results in Colombia contrast with and complement the small existing literature on
electoral fraud. Most related is the seminal research of Lehoucq and Molina (2002), who
studied the intensity and spatial distribution of over a thousand legal accusations of ballot
rigging in Costa Rica between 1901 and 1946. They ￿nd that fraud accusations were more
prevalent in the three poorest and least populated provinces of the country, where social
di⁄erentiation was more pronounced and it was harder to protect civil liberties. Ziblatt
(2009) using data on complaints of electoral misconduct from pre-1914 Germany ￿nds that
electoral fraud was greater in areas with high land concentration. His interpretation of this
is that strong local elites captured local state institutions and used these to commit fraud
and sustain their power. Finally, Baland and Robinson (2008) ￿nd that traditional landed
elites in Chile coerced workers into voting for conservative parties prior to 1958.4
The ￿ndings of our paper are somewhat di⁄erent from this literature. First, we try to
investigate if the presence of the central state reduces fraud, which appears not to have
been directly tested before. Second, unlike Ziblatt or Baland and Robinson, we ￿nd that
higher land inequality is correlated with less electoral fraud, at least in the sense of ballot
stu¢ ng. We believe that the reason for this is that, unlike late 19th century Germany or
1950s Chile, local economic elites in Colombia were not closely associated with political
parties. Therefore, they were not in a position to ￿ capture￿local institutions in the way
Ziblatt describes. Moreover, the central state was much weaker. Unlike Prussian Junkers
or the Hacendados of Chile￿ s Central Valley, Colombian landowners could not rely on basic
things such as social order, and they had little interest in encouraging the anarchy that went
along with electoral fraud. Third, unlike Lehoucq and Molina, but similar to Ziblatt, we
do not ￿nd a lot of evidence that ￿ modernization￿reduced fraud since we ￿nd that electoral
coercion is positively correlated with measures of human capital. This ￿nding is in line with
recent work on the empirical problems of simple modernization ideas (Acemoglu, Johnson,
Robinson and Yared, 2008).5
analysis of whether the Catholic Church in Latin America supported or opposed dictatorships). Neither did
it contemplate forming its own party (see Kalyvas, 1996, on the roots of European Christian democracy).
4Other related work is that of Cox and Kousser (1981), and there is also a rich case study literature on
electoral fraud in the United States, see Bensel (2004). See also Posada-Carb￿ (2000) on Latin America and
Lehoucq (2003) for a conceptual overview.
5Unfortunately it is not possible to investigate in Colombia several of the issues which the literature
raises. For instance, it is impossible to collect meaningful data on either turnout or political competition
during this period since elections were either very fraudulent, or were uncontested. Wilkinson (2004) for
instance, ￿nds that electoral violence is more likely in close elections in India and Ziblatt (2009) also ￿nds
more fraud in more competitive elections. Since we have no way to know if an election is close, we cannot
5Our approach also has the advantage that for our measure of ballot stu¢ ng we have
actual data on the extent of fraud as opposed to complaints about fraud. Since accusations
of fraud may be used strategically, it is useful to have a relatively objective source (though
our data on coercion does come from such accusations).
In addition to this political economy literature, our paper makes a contribution to the
historical literature on Colombian politics. Posada-Carb￿ (1997, p. 246, 248) notes ￿The
Conservative Hegemony, particularly the last two decades of its rule, remains one of the
relatively less studied periods in Colombia￿ s political history ... To what extent and under
what circumstances the conservative regime was able to manipulate the electoral process is
a question that merits further consideration.￿The empirical work in our paper throws new
light on precisely this issue. Our paper also builds on the work of the political economy of
Colombia by Acemoglu, Bautista, Querub￿n, and Robinson (2008). We borrow heavily from
their data construction for the case of Cundinamarca, and several of our ￿ndings are very
consistent with theirs. In particular we ￿nd that the presence of high land inequality tends
to be associated with good outcomes, and our interpretation of this is related to the one
they propose.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we give the historical background to
the 1922 presidential election, and we describe the institutional set-up and contemporary
accounts of fraud. Section 3 develops a simple model of ballot stu¢ ng and coercion whose
comparative statics illustrate some of our key hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data
construction and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents our econometric results, and
section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Background and Context
2.1 Main antecedents and context6
Colombia￿ s long history of ￿democratic￿ elections make it an especially interesting place
to study electoral fraud. In the words of Deas (1993) ￿The periods of authoritarianism or
militarism have been very scarce and very short ... this republic has had more elections,
investigate this claim with our data. Moreover, since we are examining data for a national election, it is not
clear if these ideas are relevant in our setting.
6This section draws mainly from Bushnell (1993), Mazzuca and Robinson (2009), Melo (1995) and Posada-
Carb￿ (1997).
6under more systems, central and federal, direct and indirect, hegemonic and proportional,
and with more consequences than any American or European country￿(p. 207).
This view of Colombian democracy must be quali￿ed, however.7 Indeed, if elections have
been traditional in Colombia, fraud has been an electoral tradition. In 1879, the following
description could be found in the Diario de Cundinamarca:
￿elections in Colombia are ... terrible confrontations of press, agitation, in-
trigue, letters, bribes, weapons, incentives for vengeance, politics, choler, men-
ace￿(Guerra, 1922, p. 608).
The period that we study was in the midst of a long period of domination by the Con-
servative party that began in 1886, known as La Regeneraci￿n (￿ The Regeneration￿ ). This
hegemony, underpinned by the 1886 constitution, lasted until 1930, though it was punctu-
ated by a massive civil war between the parties between 1899 and 1902 (￿The War of a
Thousand Days￿ ). After the war a system of power sharing was developed that involved
giving one third of the seats in the legislature to the Liberal party via an electoral system
known as the ￿ incomplete vote￿whereby the winner of the election received only two-thirds
of the seats, with the other third going to the minority party no matter how few votes they
got (Mazzuca and Robinson, 2009). These institutional changes did not in￿ uence elections
for the executive however.
The War of a Thousand Days also led to the secession of the province of Panama, with
the support of Theodore Roosevelt￿ s administration. In compensation in 1921 the United
States government paid 25 million dollars as an ￿indemnity￿payment. This in￿ ux of money
was the biggest single windfall of public revenue the country had ever received and helped
to trigger an age of prosperity known as ￿The Dance of the Millions.￿
These developments increased the value of controlling the executive in 1922 and made a
lot of money available for politically targeted public works. Given the radical centralization
of power under the 1886 constitution,8 according to which governors were appointed by the
7This optimistic view is known in Colombia as the Leyenda Rosada (￿ pink legend￿ ) to distinguish it from
the normal ￿ black legend￿about bad institutions in Latin America from the 16th century writings of de las
Casas onwards.
8A telling anecdote on the issue of centralization in the 1886 constitution occured in 1921. President
Holgu￿n, attempting to facilitate the approval of the Urrutia-Thompson treaty, invited Liberals to participate
in the cabinet. They refused, but according to Navarro (1935), when Holgu￿n was asked what he would have
done if the Liberals accepted his proposal, he answered: ￿Who cares if all ministers are Liberals if I am the
President and the Constitution is the 1886 Constitution?￿(p. 37).
7executive and mayors by the governors, local political elites needed to in￿ uence national
elections to secure a share of these rents.9
The 1922 elections also occurred at a time of momentous social change in Colombia.10 The
economy experienced a period of unprecedented prosperity, the rise of the co⁄ee economy, and
an increase in other exports such as petroleum and bananas. Rapid urbanization, moreover,
gave rise to the ￿rst signi￿cant glimmers of a labor movement in Colombia. In 1919 a
Socialist Party was established for the ￿rst time, with signi￿cant electoral presence in major
cities. By 1922, the country had already experienced a number of strikes, especially in the
transportation sector and river port unions.
On the one hand, the changes of the late 1910￿ s and early 1920￿ s had strengthened the
Liberal Party, as Liberal leaders consciously targeted urban masses and the incipient labor
class. In addition, the Socialist party had also courted the Liberals; Socialists endorsed
Benjam￿n Herrera for the 1922 election, adding considerable heft to the Liberal party￿ s
electoral power. On the other hand, the local bosses who had been the mainstay of the
Conservative hegemony faced an enormous opportunity cost to leaving o¢ ce, for they would
be left out of the distribution of rents from the Panama Indemnity.11 The con￿ uence of these
factors make this election an especially interesting one to study patterns of electoral fraud.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the election was unique in the period of La Regen-
eraci￿n for featuring an open, competitive contest between the Liberals and Conservatives.
Prior to 1914 the election of the President was indirect. In 1914, the ￿rst direct elections of
President since 1857 ￿took place with ￿ an entire absence of party strife and feeling￿ ￿(Posada-
Carb￿, 1997, p. 261). For the 1918 elections, the Liberals, led by Benjam￿n Herrera, decided
to ￿try again the old tactic of supporting a Conservative candidate, to promote divisions
within the ruling party, which seemed impossible to beat in open confrontation￿ (Melo,
1995). By 1922, however, Liberals were convinced that their party had good chances of
gaining o¢ ce with fair elections, and fraud accusations were widely publicized in the liberal
press.12 Finally, the 1926 elections ￿could be described as the ￿ private act of a few public
9In certain cases, political bosses became so entrenched in a municipality that both Liberal and Conser-
vative administrations would appoint them to the post of mayor (Acemoglu et al, 2008, p. 14).
10The socioeconomic transformation of Colombia in the 1920￿ s has received considerable attention (see,
for instance, the references to the several economic histories that have been written for the period in Posada-
Carb￿, 1997, p. 254). See also Melo (1995) and Bushnell (1993, Chapter 7) for overviews of the period.
11Deas (1993, p. 28, 220) suggests that the indemnity payment and the economic progress that came with
it were indeed a strong shock to the political system.
12For instance, Representative Garc￿a VÆsquez, debating over electoral reform in 1915, exclaimed ￿I believe,
and I could also prove this, that the Liberal party is majoritarian in the Nation￿(ACR, 1915: 854)
8employees￿ ￿(Posada-Carb￿, 1997, p. 260). This leaves the 1922 elections to examine. In
sum, both because of their context and their uniqueness, the 1922 presidential elections are
a fruitful venue for the study electoral fraud during La Regeneraci￿n.
2.2 Electoral Legislation during the La Regeneraci￿n
Legislative activity between the 1890s and 1916 reveals the ongoing concern of politicians
to control fraud (see Montoya, 1938). The content of the numerous reform proposals shows
that irregularities in the making of voting lists, vote buying, the strategic allocation of
voting tables, double-voting, and participation of the armed forces in elections were among
the elements that, in the views of politicians, corrupted elections.
An indication of the extent of this fraud comes from the fact that Conservative elites
shared power with the Liberals via the ￿incomplete vote.￿The appeal of this system was
that by giving Liberals one third of the legislature, no matter how many votes they received,
it dealt with the inability of Conservative national elites to stop local party o¢ cials and
supporters from defrauding the Liberals (Mazzuca and Robinson, 2009).13 This section
details some of the debates over electoral law between the adoption of the incomplete vote
in 1905 and the election of 1922.
2.2.1 Laws and Main Reforms, 1888-191614
Law 7 of 1888 attempted to draft a comprehensive Electoral Code to organize electoral insti-
tutions. Though its scope was more limited than that of the Electoral Code to be adopted in
1916, Law 7 established the main electoral institutions and their functions. For our purposes
the most important feature of these laws were the Jurados Electorales (electoral juries). One
such jury was elected for each electoral district by the departmental Junta de Distrito Elec-
toral. It compiled the lists of voters, elected the Jurados de Votaci￿n (voting overseers) to
be allocated at each voting table, and counted the votes. The Jurados Electorales, therefore,
had a great deal of in￿ uence over the ￿nal vote tallies in a municipality: they could decide
whom to exclude from the voter rolls or, if they so chose, they could create o¢ cial voting
tallies that suited their political alliances. Also, since the lower rungs of this bureaucracy
13Other scholars have emphasized as well the unruliness of these political bosses. Deas (1993, p. 213)
notes ￿A conservative governor admitted in 1854 that though these [caciques] were ￿ friends￿he could have
no control over them￿and Reyes (1978) concurs, and argues that, in the early twentieth Century, ￿it was
still hard for the Central government to confront a regional cacique￿(p. 118).
14This section draws mainly from Montoya (1938) and Registradur￿a Nacional del Estado Civil (1991).
9(e.g. the Jurados de Votaci￿n) were political appointees of higher ones, this meant that if a
party dominated the national legislature it ultimately controlled the entire electoral system.
In the early 20th century there were many attempts to change electoral institutions with
the Liberals continually arguing for changes they claimed would reduce fraud. One important
reform, Law 85 of December 31 of 1916, proposed by the government to counter a Liberal
project, was opposed by Liberal senator Fabio Lozano on the basis that it would not stop
￿the outrageous scandal of the prodigious multiplication of Conservative votes
to drown the Liberal majorities in the most important centers of the country ...
In election time we will still have what specialists call chocorazos in Magdalena;
canastadas in BoyacÆ and Cundinamarca; milagros de Santa Isabel in Tolima￿
(AS, 1917: 1117).
In spite of its de￿ciencies, Law 85 included several clauses aimed at reducing electoral
corruption. Apart from stipulating that voting lists should be published, article 179 declared
null elections in which the number of voters exceeded the number of those inscribed in the
electoral census. Fines were also established for Police and Army o¢ cials in￿ uencing their
subordinates in electoral matters, and imprisonment was established as the punishment for
some electoral practices such as falsi￿cation of electoral documents and violence against
electoral authorities.
Before the 1922 elections, two Laws were adopted that reformed some aspects of Law 85
of 1916: Law 70 of 1917 and Law 96 of 1920. A very illustrative article in Law 70 in terms
of the politicians￿concern about ballot stu¢ ng was added over the course of the debate
by Senator Arango and other senators (AS, 1917: 386, 392). The article disenfranchised
municipalities where the number of votes exceeded one third of the total population of the
respective municipality.15 To this end, the municipalities￿ population would have to be
computed from the latest civil census available or, in its absence, from the latest national
census available.16
In 1920, a group of Liberal politicians proposed a new modi￿cation of the Electoral Code
of 1916, which included the introduction of a cØdula, an electoral ID, and a lowered threshold
for disenfranchising municipalities. The proposed threshold was 15% of the municipality￿ s
15As will be shown below, this rule became a binding constraint on the behavior of politicians rigging
the election. In spite of the record magnitude of ballot-stu¢ ng across the country, only six municipalities
exceeded this upper bound.
16Unfortunately, there are no records of the debates on these articles in the Anales del Congreso.
10population for elections of members of Local Councils and Departmental Assemblies (in
which all males older than 21 years old could participate) and 10% of the population for
presidential and congressional elections (in which male citizens had to ful￿ll the age require-
ment plus one of the following: being literate, owning property of $1,000 pesos or more,
or earning a yearly income of over $300 pesos). Most of these modi￿cations were derailed
by Conservatives, but Law 96 of 1920 ultimately did include measures such as mandating
publication of the electoral census in a visible place and within time frames that facilitated
protests from citizens.17
It was against the backdrop of this institutional framework and ongoing debate on the
electoral organization that the 1922 elections took place. We now review some key aspects
of the 1922 presidential election and fraud episode.
2.3 The 1922 Episode and the Convenci￿n de IbaguØ
The presidential contest between Ospina and Herrera in 1922 was very competitive. Herrera
won in every major city. Ospina obtained high vote shares in the countryside. The elections
were obscured, however, by fraud accusations, which were so widespread that they led Liberal
elites to actively challenge the result. As Deas (1993) puts it, ￿In 1922 the Conservative
divisions were exploited by an independent Liberal coalition, and the situation was saved by
the use of force at the local level and a general reliance on fraud￿(p. 218).
Liberal representative to the national electoral council, Luis de Grei⁄, demanded upon
completion of vote counting that the following be added to the record: ￿the Liberal repre-
sentative￿ s ... conviction [is] that such verdict is not the genuine expression of popular will,
but the result of the most scandalous fraud, tolerated by authorities and facilitated, in many
cases, by government agents￿ (quoted in Blanco et al, 1922, p. 403). The Conservative
majority rejected the proposition and proclaimed Ospina as President without any mention
of the fraud denunciations.
Following the elections, Herrera decided to call for an extraordinary Liberal convention
in the city of IbaguØ, to decide, among other things, on the posture that the party would
take regarding the new government. According to Pedro Juan Navarro, after the 1922
17The debate over each of the elements of the reform was extremely animated. The spirit of the discussion
may be illustrated with Conservative congressman Sotero Peæuela￿ s closing comment in one of his interven-
tions: ￿When you in a family ￿nd an unruly young man, arrogant, vicious, if he is not Liberal, sooner or
later he ends in that party. Doctor Tirado Mac￿as once told us in the House that the women of certain life
are all Liberal: the reason is clear￿(ACR, 1920: 500).
11elections and with the Convenci￿n de IbaguØ ￿the nation￿ s horizon was tragically obscured
by the possibility of a Civil War￿(Navarro, 1935, p. 46). The threat gradually disappeared,
however, and General Herrera￿ s motto at the time ￿The Nation before the parties￿became
famous. The Convenci￿n de IbaguØ left a very complete record of Liberal complaints both
in the o¢ cial summary of the convention and in a book commissioned by the convention to
demonstrate Conservative abuses.18
The irregularities denounced include the alteration of the electoral registry, the political
activity of the clergy, and the homicide of Liberals. It is worth reproducing the following
passage from Los Partidos Pol￿ticos en Colombia, where Liberals summarized their view on
the tools that Conservatism used to remain in power:
￿Conservatism takes shelter in a castle of illegal strengths ... The electoral
law, interpreted and executed by an ad-hoc power of eminently political origin,
autonomous only in appearance, yet docile mirror in reality of the executive will.
It has been impossible to introduce, into this law, the reforms that Liberalism
has requested over and over, except when those reforms are innocuous and do
not e⁄ectively threaten the Conservative hegemony ... if we add the combative
and at times implacable attitude of priests it is clear that we ￿nd ourselves, as a
nation, witnessing maybe a unique problem in the world￿(Blanco et al, 1922, p.
15, 17).
Even considering some degree of exaggeration in the Liberal discourse, it is clear that
Conservatives used diverse fraudulent methods during the elections. Ballot-stu¢ ng and
coercion seemed to follow regional patterns. Regarding ballot stu¢ ng, Liberals accusations
claimed that the ￿fraudulent multiplication￿of votes was largest in Cundinamarca and the
Santanderes (the departments of Santander and Norte de Santander), where there were
Liberal majorities and hence
￿it was necessary ... to rely on the greatest fraud ever registered. The multi-
plication of votes caused vertigo￿(Blanco et al, 1922, p. 27).
Regarding other departments, Liberals claimed that in Valle, Antioquia and Caldas,
fraud consisted mostly of inscribing Conservatives in the voting lists even when they did
not meet the legal requirements, and obstructing the registration of Liberals. Apparently,
18Several Conservative commentators attacked the Liberal claims (e.g. Guerra,1922, Peæuela, 1922, p. 4).
12fraud was less widespread there, ￿where, if there were irregularities, at least the scandalous
￿ chocorazos￿of other departments were not observed￿ (Blanco et al, 1922, p. 399). In
AtlÆntico and Magdalena, the substitution of voting lists with fake ones is regarded as the
most common fraud, and ￿nally in Nariæo and BoyacÆ, where Conservatism was the norm
amongst ￿illiterate farmers,￿Conservatism ￿multiplied votes appallingly, and hence the two
illiterate Departments lead the number of voters￿(Blanco et al, 1922, p. 27). These claims
are basically consistent with our data in Table 1. We indeed ￿nd very high levels of ballot
stu¢ ng in Cundinamarca and the Santanderes, but much less in Antioquia, Valle and Caldas.
In terms of coercion, it was especially pronounced in AtlÆntico and Bolivar, along the
coast, and in the Santanderes. In both of these regions Conservative governors distributed
thousands of ri￿ es to Conservative towns so that they could form guardias c￿vicas (civic
guards), purportedly to maintain order during the election. Predictably, these civic guards
behaved like posses or vigilante groups, and they joined a highly politicized police force in
keeping Liberals from the polls.
2.4 Corroborating the Mechanism19
Having described the background, context, and immediate aftermath of the election, we now
turn to a more detailed discussion of fraud itself.
2.4.1 The Rewards of Fraud
Though we cannot directly observe the political kickbacks received by politicians who helped
the Conservative party carry the election, the historical record has circumstantial but com-
pelling evidence that those who stu⁄ed the ballot dramatically bene￿ted from a greater share
of the economic rents coming from the Panama Indemnity.
As late as the end of 1921, Ospina lacked any signi￿cant political presence in Cundina-
marca.20 At the same time, local Conservative Alfredo VÆsquez Cobo controlled ￿ve of six
representatives to the department￿ s assembly (Colmenares, 1984, p. 38). Using this power,
VÆsquez Cobo had granted himself a monopoly over the department￿ s liquor rents and with
those funds had created a formidable electoral machine in the region (VØlez, 1921, p. 17,
19This section draws largely from Chaves (2008)
20In a last ditch e⁄ort to court Cundinamarca voters, Ospina started appearing in public dressed in the
traditional garb of Cundinamarques peasants, a move that earned him repeated mockery from the national
press (Colmenares, 1984, p. 102).
1341, 75). VÆsquez seems to have used his machine to support Pedro Nel Ospina in 1922,
so Cundinamarca was ultimately one of the provinces that delivered the greatest number
of fraudulent votes to Ospina￿ s election. Tellingly, the ￿rst foreign loan processed by the
Ospina administration (for ￿ve million dollars or one ￿fth of the entire indemnity payment)
was destined to VÆsquez￿ s pet public works project: the Paci￿c railroad, in VÆsquez￿ s home
region.
Probably the most apparent instance of Ospina￿ s political indebtedness was toward the
BoyacÆ caciques. BoyacÆ, an impoverished, fervently Catholic, rural department, was an-
other epicenter of Conservative ballot stu¢ ng in 1922. Ospina appointed several of these
caciques to important political jobs for which they were not quali￿ed. One, Arist￿bulo
Archila, was made the Treasury Minister, even though he was ￿as slow in ￿nancial matters
and economic science, as he was experienced, sagacious, and domineering in the intricate
small-town politicking of the Conservative party￿(Navarro, 1935, p. 103). Moreover, Ospina
appointed him in spite of well-founded rumors that the person could not speak English.21
2.4.2 Ballot-stu¢ ng and Jurados Electorales
As we discussed above, ballot-stu¢ ng was generally the work of Conservative-dominated
Jurados Electorales. Liberals ￿led thousands of complaints detailing the many delays and
irregularities in the formation of voting lists. A couple of examples, from Barranquilla, AtlÆn-
tico (a historically Liberal city) and from ChiquinquirÆ, Cundinamarca, su¢ ce to illustrate
the type of legal and bureaucratic maneuvering used to tamper with vote tallies. Liberals in
Barranquilla griped that ￿Here, all sorts of obstructions are being placed in front of Liberal
voters, and the [electoral] census record has been distorted, once sealed and signed, to in￿ ate
it in the last minute with nine hundred additional names, and in spite of protests, it ap-
pears that this scandal will not be recti￿ed￿(Paz and Solano, 1922, p. 54, from a telegram
by the Liberal Committee in Barranquilla). Similarly, reports surfaced from ChiquinquirÆ
claiming that ￿In this city inscription activity involved only Liberals, who are the majority
and reached one thousand names. However, in the de￿nite lists six thousand Conservatives
21Political cartoonist Ricardo Rendon gave the sharpest commentary on naming an unprepared, if po-
litically powerful, rural boss for this o¢ ce. Rendon￿ s cartoon shows Archila talking to Edwin Kemmerer,
the Princeton economist who advised and supervised Colombia￿ s ￿nancial transformations during Ospina￿ s
tenure. Instead of discussing bonds, interest rates, or money supply, Kemmerer is giving a primary school
English lesson: ￿Pencil, book, ruler, paper, box pen,￿he says, pointing at the objects on the desk (quoted
on Colmenares, 1984, p. 197).
14appeared also, ￿lling the allowed legal space￿(quoted in Paz and Solano, 1922, p. 65, from
Liberal Committee in ChiquinquirÆ).
2.4.3 Priests and Violence
Priests were instrumental in generating Conservative coercion against Liberal voters. The
ChiquinquirÆ Liberals alluded to above summarized this best: in all the municipalities neigh-
boring them, ￿Dominicans stoke[d] multitudinary hatred￿(Paz and Solano, 1922, p. 65).
The fact that disenfranchisement and coercion were most prevalent in Santander and
Norte de Santander, provinces with a long history of con￿ icts between religious fanaticism
and radical Liberal anticlericalism, provides suggestive evidence for our view. Abel suggests
that the clergy￿ s meddling in elections was much more pronounced and aggressive in the
Santanderes. He concludes that the church was ￿completely politicized￿in the Santanderes.
Priests ￿inherited political alliances and were obligated to pander to the political whims of
[their] benefactors ...[they] could ￿nd himself without tithing [if they did not]￿(Abel, 1987,
p. 90).
The consequences of a fanatically politicized clergy were apparent throughout the 1922
presidential election. Liberals from the town of VØlez, in Santander, protested that the local
parish priest had become a powerful political boss in his own right and was causing hundreds
of Liberals to be disenfranchised. He had (successfully) ￿ordered [the electoral board] to
deny Liberal reclamations about omissions in the electoral census, leaving only 200 Liberals
o¢ cially registered to vote in the town￿(El Tiempo, January 19th, quoted in Blanco et al,
1922, p. 324). Priests in the Santanderes, moreover, were especially successful at inciting
partisan hatred and disseminating the kinds of stories that could spur Conservative violence
(see Chaves, 2008).
2.4.4 Coercion and Disenfranchisement
As we mentioned above, coercion was mainly a tool used by Conservatives to disenfranchise
Liberal voters. Politicians could plausibly have used violence to coerce voters to cast their
ballot for a particular candidate, but by and large that is not what we observed in the
historical record. Coercion generally played a complementary role to ballot stu¢ ng. On
the one hand, it lowered Liberal turnout; and on the other, it cowed the opposition in a
municipality so that Conservative Electoral Juries could alter voting tallies without fearing
a Liberal backlash. Though many of the Liberal complaints in Blanco et al. (1922) contain
15more than a healthy dose of exaggeration, the overall pattern they suggest is con￿rmed by
our econometric results. It is instructive to examine these complaints to gain a sense of the
main uses and purpose of Conservative coercion.
Underlying frequent riotous outbursts of partisan violence, there was an atmosphere of
almost martial law in the regions of the Santanderes and the Atlantic coast. Most of the
time this militarization was purposefully directed towards ￿ problematic￿Liberal towns.22 A
reporter for a national newspaper summarized the Conservative strategy, as he witnessed
it in the town of Salazar, Norte de Santander, in the following way: ￿Conservatives in this
town and its surroundings have begun a full-￿ edged military campaign ... Authorities have
distributed arms to diverse towns in the province, and the government￿ s agents try to make
ostentation [sic] of their strength, with the goal of frightening Liberal peasants, so that they
do not show up to vote on election day￿(quoted in Blanco et al., 1922, p. 306).
This strategy, in fact, was applied e⁄ectively across the country. Violent deaths were few
precisely because coercion was so e⁄ective at driving away Liberal voters. In a town on the
Atlantic coast, for instance, Liberals abandoned the polls because ￿the coastguard￿ s cannons
were ￿xed on our Liberal masses, while on the rooftops of all the houses the guardias civicas
were positioned to shoot . . . [We] left to avoid the bloodbath￿(El Espectador, February
17th, Blanco et al., 1922, p. 115). Allegedly 4000 people in Lorica, Bolivar had to disperse
without being able to vote on that occasion. In the town of Rosario, wrote El Tiempo, the
police corps ￿had spread into a battle formation￿ to greet Liberals heading to the polls,
￿threatening to shoot if they tried to vote￿(El Tiempo, February 16th, quoted on Blanco et
al., 1922, p. 317). Liberal voters walked away without casting their ballots. San Cayetano,
a town neighboring Cœcuta, and Salazar de las Palmas, both su⁄ered a similar fate.
Once coercion had driven Liberals away from the polls, it would also be used to legitimize
ballot-stu¢ ng. Such was the case in San Luis and Concordia, in Norte de Santander. Polls
had opened hours too early in San Luis, and the electoral board had declared all the registered
voters accounted for before the bulk of Liberals had reached the ballot-box. The minority
members of the electoral board, whose signature was needed to make the result o¢ cial, had
refused to authenticate the ￿nal tally, but under threats of violence from local police they
were forced to certify it. Concordia￿ s minority members on the electoral board, claimed
El Tiempo￿ s correspondent, were ￿nearly lynched [by the police] because they would not
22In the town of La Florida, for instance, there was constant patrolling and ninety-six Liberals were
arrested on the eve of the election after a Liberal riot (Blanco et al, 1922, pp. 329-332).
16authorize a fraud committed in their very presence￿(Blanco et al., 1922, p. 317).
What about Liberal wrongdoings? Unfortunately, possibly because they were victorious
but also partly because Liberal fraud was less widespread, there is no comparable Conserva-
tive e⁄ort to denounce the Liberal abuses systematically. However, the Liberals themselves
did recognize possible Liberal abuses, though they claimed they were minor (e.g., Blanco et
al, 1922, p. 25). For this reason, the evidence on electoral fraud is heavily biased towards
Liberal accusations. However, it seems very unlikely that Liberal fraud was very widespread.
A review of complaints sent to the Minister of Government during the election showed hardly
any written by Conservatives.
3 A Simple Model
We now develop a simple model of the relationship between coercion and ballot stu¢ ng that
helps to show how some of the main results we discussed in the introduction ￿t together. We
do not aspire for generality and make simplifying assumptions to make the analysis tractable.
We focus on the decision problem of Conservative elites in a particular municipality who
wish to supply votes to the national politicians. Given the overwhelming evidence that it was
the incumbent Conservative party that was stu¢ ng ballots we do not model the equilibrium
extent of stu¢ ng and coercion as a game, though this could easily be done. Conservatives
have two instruments: ballot stu¢ ng s and coercion c. They aim to maximize the margin of
victory over the Liberals because the greater this margin, the more support they provide to
the national Conservative presidential candidate. The historical evidence suggests that local
Conservative elites expected to be rewarded for this, so we can think of there being a ￿ price￿
￿ associated with delivering support. Hence if the win margin in a particular municipality is
v
c + s ￿ v
‘
where vc is the number of conservative votes and v‘ are the number of Liberal votes, we can
think of the bene￿t as being ￿
￿
vc + s ￿ v‘￿
. Obviously we assume that all stu⁄ed votes are
in favor of the Conservatives.
Both stu¢ ng ballots and coercion are costly so the local elite will want to choose s and
c to maximize the net bene￿ts. Either activity may lead to violence and revolt by local
Liberals, a possibility which may lead the local results to be anulled. Also, coercion may
17disrupt local economic activities in which Conservatives politicians were invested. We assume
that these costs can be captured by simple quadratic costs functions, so we can write the
















In (1) ￿ and   are positive parameters, which we shall interpret later, and p is the number
of priests in a particular municipality. Hence we assume that the marginal cost of coercion
is decreasing in the number of priests in a municipality. This seems reasonable since the
historical evidence suggests that priests were able to use the pulpit and their in￿ uence to
solve the collective action problem for Conservatives and to organize coercive activities.
The main bene￿t of coercion was that it reduced the number of Liberal voters, freeing
up space for ballot stu¢ ng. Hence we postulate the following relationship
v
‘ = g (c) (2)
with g0 < 0 so that greater coercion reduces the number of Liberal votes. If coercion gets
less and less e⁄ective we also have g00 ￿ 0:
A constraint on (1) was that the total number of votes cast was limited by Law 70 of 1917,
which threatened disenfranchisement if ballots ￿ cast￿were greater than 1/3 of the population
in a municipality. Denote this maximum number of votes vmax: Then we have the constraint
v
c + s + v
‘ ￿ v
max: (3)
Finally, it does not make sense to think of both vc and p as varying in an unrelated
fashion. Rather, it seems likely that in places where there were more priests, the greater
were the number of Conservative voters. This may be because either the Catholic church
tended to put more churches and priests in intrinsically Conservative areas, or because priests
were successfull at changing people￿ s political preferences. In either case we can capture this
in a simple way by postulating that there is a increasing relationship between the number
of priests and the number of Conservative voters
v
c = h(p) (4)
where h0 > 0. We also assume that h00 ￿ 0:
18Therefore local Conservatives would maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4). In general,
the inequality (3) may or may not bind. However, as we noted above, our data suggests that
it almost certainly was binding, and we therefore assume that this will be the case.23 In this




















max ￿ h(p) ￿ g (c))g
0 (c) = 0: (5)
Conservative elites set coercion such that the marginal bene￿ts are equal to the marginal
costs. The bene￿ts of coercion are captured by the fact that ￿2￿g0 (c) > 0: increased
coercion reduces the number of Liberal voters and thus increases the equilibrium amount of
ballot stu¢ ng and hence Conservative ￿ votes￿ .
For (5) to characterize a maximum the second-order condition must be satis￿ed, which






max ￿ h(p) ￿ g (c))g
00 (c) ￿ ￿[g
0 (c)]
2 ￿ ! < 0;
which we assume holds.24
The empirical predictions of our model come from computing the comparative statics
implied by the ￿rst-order condition. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we can derive
23It is interesting to note here the quote from Paz and Solano we reproduced in section 2.4.2, which
remarked on ￿￿lling the allowed legal space￿ .
24Substitute the ￿rst-order condition in the second-order condition to verify we are in a local maximum:









































The ￿rst result says that an increased ￿ price￿for a stu⁄ed ballot generates more coercion.
This result captures the ￿ Dance of the Millions￿on the ￿ Panama Indemnity￿e⁄ect, which, as
we noted, seems to have been important in raising the stakes in the 1922 election and the
equilibrium extent of fraud. The second result, while obvious, is important for our discussion.
More priests reduced the costs of coercion and induced more of it. The last two derivatives
with respect to the parameters in the cost functions ￿ and   can be thought of in terms of
our discussion of the ￿ Weberian state￿ . Greater state strength, higher ￿ and  , made both
coercion and stu¢ ng more costly. This reduces the incentive to engage in coercion directly,
but also indirectly since it discourages ballot stu¢ ng, and it is the desire to create room for
ballot stu¢ ng that induces coercion.
We now turn to the implied comparative statics for stu¢ ng, where we use the above






















These three results are immediate. An increase in the price of votes raises the total number
of stu⁄ed ballots, and indeed this is the point of coercion. Since the Weberian state reduces
coercion it also reduces the number of stu⁄ed ballots. It is important to note, however, that
these results are only true because they hold the number of conservative voters constant.
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7 0; (6)
This shows that actually the impact of priests on the number of stu⁄ed ballots is ambiguous.
This is because a larger number of priests tends to be naturally associated with a lot of
conservative voters (from equation (4)) and so we will tend to see a lot of priests associated
with less ￿ space￿available for stu¢ ng. If the correlation between priests and Conservative
preference vote is high enough relative to the increase in coercion and consequent fall in
Liberal vote that comes about with more priests, then (6) will be negative. In this case the
model would predict that priests would be positively correlated with coercion but negatively
related to ballot stu¢ ng. This is exactly as we ￿nd in the data, and it is interesting that very
Conservative provinces, such as Antioquia, which are also renown for their piety, feature less
ballot stu¢ ng than provinces such as Santander, which are historically linked to the Liberal
Party.
4 The Data
4.1 Ballot Stu¢ ng
Our measure of ballot stu¢ ng - the extent of fraudulent votes - relies on the comparison of
the total number of votes cast in each municipality with a reasonable estimate of the size of
the franchise from information of the 1918 National Census. This measure is imprecise since
we do not have accurate data on the real level of turnout. The arbitrary exclusion of voters
from the electoral registries, which historical evidence suggests was common, is especially
problematic, as several of the municipalities that reveal no ballot stu¢ ng in our database
might have experienced stu¢ ng nonetheless. Finally, our measure of ballot stu¢ ng is not
likely to be in￿ uenced by the strategic considerations a⁄ecting other measures of electoral
fraud based on testimonies of party followers.25
To estimate ballot stu¢ ng we proceed as follows. As explained above, under the 1916
25In Los Partidos Pol￿ticos en Colombia, where Liberal complaints were summarized, Liberals used the
available statistics to draw some calculations in the spirit of the ones we construct in this section showing
results for each department and the country as a whole, and attributing the ￿multiplication of votes￿to the
conservative party (see Rodr￿guez, 1922).
21Electoral Code, su⁄rage rights were restricted to adult males (over 21 years of age), and
for presidential elections male citizens had to ful￿ll the age requirement plus one of the
following: being literate, owning property of $1,000 pesos or more, or earning a yearly income
of over $300 pesos. The income and wealth requirements implied by these thresholds are
fairly restrictive. For example, nominal GDP per-capita in Colombia in 1922 was about $84
(GRECO, 2002) so that to qualify to vote using the income criterion an illiterate person would
have had to earn almost 3 times average income. Given that around 50% of adult males were
literate in 1918, very few illiterates could have earned such high incomes. Using data on land
ownership for the department of Cundinamarca in 1890 (see below) and adjusting for prices
suggests that if one owned $1,000 worth of land one would be in the top 21% of landowners.
Hence, it seems very unlikely that an illiterate male would have been able to qualify to vote
on the basis of wealth holdings either. In consequence we assume that everyone who could
qualify to vote on the basis of land ownership and income was also literate. This assumption
implies that landowners and earners of income over $300 are subsets of the literate males,
and that the number of adult literate males is a reasonable estimate of the franchise.26
We therefore use the 1918 National Census to compute the number of males over 19 years
of age in every municipality (the census does not report males over 21), and multiply this
number by the literacy rate of men in each municipality. Since the presidential election was
held in 1922 and the Census was made in 1918, we may be underestimating the franchise.
Hence, assuming a rate of population growth consistent with the information from the 1918
and 1928 National Censuses, we also adjust our estimate of the adult literate male population
to allow for population growth. This constitutes our measure of the size of the franchise in
each municipality. It is clear that this measure of the franchise is an overestimate since it
assumes a 100% voter turnout and since only people older than 21 could vote. This will
therefore tend to create relatively conservative measures of electoral fraud.
We combine our estimate of the franchise with the total number of votes cast in each
municipality according to the o¢ cial electoral registries sent by local authorities to the Gran
Consejo Electoral.
26These assumptions are probably implausible in a number of cases. For instance, there are municipalities
with extremely low literacy rates, which deliver extremely low estimates of literate adults (2 men, in the
most extreme case in San AndrØs de Sotavento, Bol￿var). This implies that stu⁄ed ballots as percent of
estimated franchise in San AndrØs de Sotavento was 22,000%! One could expect it to be likely that where
so few men were literate there were some non-literate individuals with the income or wealth requirements to
get voting rights. There is no easy solution to this problem other than to check that our results are robust
to dropping such municipalities, which they are (details from authors upon request).
224.2 Measuring Coercion
To measure coercion we coded the information from the proceedings of the Convenci￿n de
IbaguØ. In the book there are many accusations of coercion, which we sorted into di⁄erent
types of coercion using dummy variables to capture whether or not a particular type of
violence was present in a municipality. These are
1. Violence=1 if the municipality had reports of actual violence breaking out: brawls,
gun-shots, confrontations with injuries or casualties.
2. Intimidation/Harassment=1 for reports of incarcerating Liberals, subjecting them to
random searches and detainment, coercive measures to prevent Liberal propagandizing
or activism.
3. Arms distribution/paramilitary activity=1 for reports of organized armed Conserva-
tives who are not police or army, or distribution of arms for these bodies. Acts of
intimidation by these bodies.
4. Coercion=1 indicator for the union of violence, intimidation, arms etc. 1 if any of the
above happened.
In the empirical work we investigate only Coercion. See the data appendix for more
details on the construction of these data.
4.3 Explanatory Variables
One of the most important hypotheses we wish to investigate in our paper is that the presence
of the state reduced the extent of ballot stu¢ ng and coercion. As proxies for the presence of
the state in di⁄erent dimensions we use data from the 1918 population census on the number
of public employees and the number of agents of the armed forces in each municipality. We
use these variables on their own and also add them to construct a simple index of the presence
of the state.27
The historical literature also emphasizes the important political role of clergy during
elections, and as we have already seen, this was also much remarked upon by Liberals at the
27Ideally, we would like to examine the impact of the police and the army separately. Unfortunately, the
1918 Census does not distinguish between the two.
23time. From the 1918 Census we have the number of priests in each municipality, which we
express as a proportion of the total population.
Unfortunately we do not have a good control for the level of economic development at
the municipality level. Though the Census does report data on literacy and schooling we
obviously cannot use this as a control variable for ballot stu¢ ng since, given that we use the
literate male population to construct the number of stu⁄ed ballots, they are mechanically
related to our measure of ballot stu¢ ng. We do use these as control variables when coercion
is the dependent variable however. Nonetheless, the Census does include the proportion of
people in a municipality who were vaccinated. Since this is very likely related to income
per-capita we use this variable as an imperfect control for income when ballot stu¢ ng is the
dependent variable.
The literature also suggests that there may be large di⁄erences between core and pe-
ripheral areas of municipalities, and it is desirable to control for this directly. To do so we
include the earliest foundation date of the municipality. We expect newer and more periph-
eral municipalities to exhibit more fraud, as the presence of the state is likely to be weaker
in such municipalities.28
4.4 Descriptive Statistics from Colombia
Table 2 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the whole of Colombia. The ￿rst row
reports the ratio of stu⁄ed ballots to adult males for the 546 municipalities for which we
have complete data (we lack occupational data for Boyaca, Bolivar and Magdalena). The
￿rst row shows that the mean number of stu⁄ed ballots was 19% of the total adult male
population. Looking across this row it is interesting to note that the proportion of ballots
stu⁄ed seems to vary little between municipalities with and without recorded coercion.
With respect to the presence of the state, the proportion of the population which were
clergy was 50% greater in areas with low stu⁄ed ballots (municipalities less than the median),
while the presence of members of the army and of the bureaucracy also seems to be higher
in places with relatively low levels of ballot stu¢ ng (0.55 instead of 0.47).
Though as noted, we cannot say anything about the relationship between human capital
and ballot stu¢ ng, the table also suggests with respect to coercion that schooling is greater
in places with coercion compared to those without.
28We also used distance (in kms) to the departmental capital, which gave similar results.
24Looking at the vaccination rate, this is higher in municipalities with low ballot stu¢ ng
but, interestingly, higher in places where coercion is present than in those where coercion is
absent, though the di⁄erent is quite small.
4.5 Data on Cundinamarca
In addition to the data on stu⁄ed ballots and coercion and the covariates from the 1918
Census we have a variety of other historical data for Cundinamarca from Acemoglu et al.
(2008). These authors used cadastral (land census) data collected by the state of Cundi-
namarca in 1879 and 1890. We use a very standard measure of land inequality from their
paper - the land gini coe¢ cient, which measures land inequality among landowners.29 For
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where i = 1;:::;nt denotes the total number of land owners at time t, yi;t is the value of land




yi;t is the average value of land at time t.
Throughout most of our analysis, we average the gini coe¢ cients across the two dates for
each municipality to arrive to our measure of (average) land gini. The average gini over this
entire period was 0.65 (see Table 2 below).
To measure political concentration Acemoglu et al. (2008) collected data on politician
(mayor) names from the Registro del Estado and Gaceta de Cundinamarca, o¢ cial news-
papers that published the names of principal and substitute mayors appointed in each mu-
nicipality between 1875 and 1895. They used these data to construct a measure of the
concentration of political power. Their measure of political concentration for municipality
m at time t is computed as:
29Despite its widespread use, the land gini su⁄ers from an obvious problem. An area in which all land is
held by two very large landowners will have a low value of the land gini, because land is equally distributed
among landowners. But if we looked at the population as a whole, there would be tremendous amount
of land inequality. To alleviate this problem, Acemoglu et al. (2008) constructed an alternative measure,
overall land gini, which again computes equation (7), but uses the total number of families and assigns zero
land holdings to the families who do not appear in the catastro. We found this variable to be completely
ucorrelated with ballot stu¢ ng and other outcomes, and it did not in￿ uence any of the results we report
here, so we dropped it from the analysis.
25pmt = ￿
Number of Di⁄erent Individuals in Powermt
Number of mayor appointmentsmt
:
The negative sign in front is introduced so that higher values of the index correspond to
higher political concentration (thus making the interpretation of the coe¢ cients easier).
Consequently, our political concentration index takes a value of -1 when there is very low
political concentration, and values close to 0 for high levels of concentration. We computed
this index for the whole period 1875-1895. The mean of this variable is -0.55.
In Table 2 Panel B we report some descriptive statistics just for Cundinamarca. For
the variables we discussed above there are a few di⁄erences. For instance, ballot stu¢ ng is
now much higher in municipalities without coercion (0.34) compared to municipalities with
coercion (0.19). In terms of our new explanatory variables the land gini is higher in places
with low ballot stu¢ ng (0.67 compared to 0.63), while political concentration is also higher
in municipalities with less than median levels of ballot stu¢ ng. This table also suggests that
schooling and literacy are higher in places with less ballot stu¢ ng and more coercion.30
5 Econometric Analysis
Having presented the main features of our measures of ballot stu¢ ng and coercion, this
section analyzes some of the correlations between those measures and other variables at the
municipality level, in an attempt to describe which characteristics were associated with a
higher incidence and intensity of ballot stu¢ ng and coercion.
5.1 Ballot stu¢ ng and Coercion in Colombia
Table 3 present the results of simple ordinary least squares regressions for the whole of
Colombia￿ s municipalities. The basic model we estimate is
ym = G
0
m￿ + ￿d + X
0
m￿ + "m (8)
30In the raw data there is now a distinct negative correlation between coercion and ballot stu¢ ng. We
also see a strong negative correlation between both land inequality and political concentration and ballot
stu¢ ng. The presence of the clergy is negatively correlated with ballot stu¢ ng and positively correlated
with coercion. Results available upon request.






represents the number of stu⁄ed ballots in municipality m and pm the adult male population
of the municipality. In panel B the dependent variable is cm, which is a dummy such that
cm = 1 if municipality m experienced a coercion incident. In (8) G0
m is a vector of variables
capturing the presence of clergy and of the state in municipality m, ￿d is a department ￿xed
e⁄ect, where the subscript d indexes department, and X0
m is a vector of covariates, such as
the vaccination rate or the foundation date of the municipality and also includes a constant.
The error term "m captures all omitted in￿ uences, including any deviations from linearity.
Equation (8) will consistently estimate the parameters of interest ￿ if Cov(gm;"m) = 0 for
all gm 2 Gm. Nevertheless, we emphasize that these covariance restrictions are unlikely
to hold in practice, since the presence of the state and political outcomes such as ballot
stu¢ ng and coercion are all jointly determined, and this is why we do not emphasize causal
interpretations of our ￿ndings.






The ￿rst three columns introduce sequentially the proportion of the population which are
clergy, armed forces, or bureaucracy. All regressions have departmental ￿xed e⁄ects. The
￿rst column shows that the presence of clergy is signi￿cantly negatively correlated with ballot
stu¢ ng. The estimated coe¢ cient is ￿23:54 with a standard error of 5:85 and so is highly
signi￿cant.
This is a quite large e⁄ect quatitatively. As a reference point, a one percent decrease in
the ratio of stu⁄ed ballots to adult males around the mean value of this variable nationwide
implies a fall from 0.30 to 0.27. The average municipality in the base sample has around
670 adult males. Thus, every one percent decrease in the ratio stu⁄ed ballots around the
mean implies a fall in the number of stu⁄ed ballots of about 20 (0.03*670). To see the
impact of the clergy, take the estimate in column (1). An increase in the number of clergy
from the mean national value of 5 priests per one thousand inhabitants to 14 priests per
thousand inhabitants, corresponding to a one-standard deviation increase, leads to a fall of
about 2% ((0.09/100)*23.5*100) in the ratio of stu⁄ed ballots to adult males. Per the above
calculation, this means about 40 stu⁄ed ballots less in such municipality.
The second column shows that though the estimated coe¢ cient on armed forces is neg-
ative it is not statistically signi￿cant. In the third column the proportion of the population
which is bureaucrats is estimated to have a coe¢ cient of ￿4:38 (s.e.=2:11), which is again
signi￿cant.
27Column 4 adds all of these three explanatory variables at the same time. Though this
reduces the coe¢ cient on bureaucracy and makes it insigni￿cant, the correlation with the
clergy is almost unchanged as is the level of signi￿cance. Since there is a concern about the
presence of multicollinearity, in column 5 we amalgamate the data for army and bureaucracy
by simply adding them to form an index of state presence. This has a negative coe¢ cient
though is not signi￿cant, and nothing happens to he coe¢ cient on clergy or its standard
error.
In column 6 we drop the departmental capitals because the case study literature suggests
that the political dynamics of these places may be distinct. Nevertheless, this has little
impact on the results.
In column 7 we add the foundation date of the municipality as a simple control for
how central or peripheral it is in the municipality. Municipalities which were founded more
recently tend to be more isolated and further from the departmental capital. This seems to
be positively correlated with ballot stu¢ ng suggesting, as we would have conjectured, that
more recently founded and more peripheral municipalities have more ballot stu¢ ng, but it
does not qualitatively change the other results.
Finally, in column 8 we add the proportion of the population who is vaccinated as a simple
control for the prosperity of the municipality. The coe¢ cient on this variable is negative,
as we would have anticipated, but it is not signi￿cant. Moreover, it has little in￿ uence on
the results of interest suggesting that it is unlikely that our ￿ndings are being driven by the
simple fact that ballot stu¢ ng is lower in more prosperous municipalities.
Panel B estimates very similar regressions except that now the dependent variable is the
dummy variable for coercion. One can think of these regressions then as a linear probability
model. The big fact that jumps out of this panel of the table is that the presence of the
clergy is positively correlated with coercion. The e⁄ect is very robust across the di⁄erent
speci￿cations and no other variable appears to be signi￿cantly correlated with coercion.
It is interesting to examine some of these results graphically. Figure 1, for instance, plots
the data for the ratio of clergy to municipal population against the extent of ballot stu¢ ng.
There is evidence of a quite distinct negative relationship. Figure 2 replaces the clergy by
the number of government bureaucrats and again shows evidence of a negative relationship.
285.2 Preliminary Interpretation
The results from the regressions for Colombia as a whole suggest a couple of things. First,
the presence of priests is positively correlated with coercion but negatively correlated with
ballot stu¢ ng. The ￿rst fact is certainly consistent with the claims of Liberals at the time
and a great deal of historical literature. What is important for interpreting the second
correlation, however, is the form of coercion in which priests were involved. Speci￿cally,
this was targeted at keeping Liberals away from the polls. Hence where there were priests,
Liberals were stopped from participation, thus turnout was lower, and thus the extent of
ballot stu¢ ng according to our measure would be lower. One could imagine that using
coercion to keep Liberals away from the polling booths would have given Conservatives the
freedom to engage in even more egregious ballot stu¢ ng. Our results suggest, however,
that while this may have increased the margin by which Conservatives won in a particular
municipality, other things equal, it actually reduced the extent of ballot stu¢ ng relative to
the potential franchise.
Second, the regressions also provide some weak support for the notion that the presence
of state bureaucrats is negatively correlated with ballot stu¢ ng, though this does not appear
very robust.
5.3 Ballot stu¢ ng in Cundinamarca
We now focus just on the department of Cundinamarca. Table 4 re-estimates the models
of Table 3 using only our data for Cundinamarca. This shows some interesting patterns.
First, as for the whole of Colombia, the presence of clergy is negatively correlated with
ballot stu¢ ng and positively correlated with coercion. The coe¢ cients are nearly always
statistically signi￿cant, and their magnitude is not very dissimilar than that for the entire
country.
Table 4 Panel A however shows much more robust e⁄ects of state presence on ballot
stu¢ ng. The presence of the bureaucracy is always signi￿cantly negatively correlated with
ballot stu¢ ng and the estimated impact of the army, though not typically signi￿cant at
standard con￿dence levels, is always negative.
Finally in Panel A the vaccination rate is also signi￿cantly negatively correlated with
ballot stu¢ ng, and while this reduces the impact and signi￿cance of the presence of clergy,
it has little impact on the correlation between bureaucracy and ballot stu¢ ng. We would
29interpret these results as suggesting that our ￿ndings are not being driven by unobservables
such as income per-capita.
Turning to panel B we see once more a very robust relationship between clergy and
coercion. Coercion and the clergy go together. This part of the table also suggests two other
relatively robust ￿ndings. First, the presence of the army reduces coercion. Second, coercion
is greater in places with higher human capital. For instance, in column 9 the schooling
rate has an estimated coe¢ cient of 0:323 (s.e.=0.096), suggesting that greater schooling is
associated with greater coercion. As with our ￿ndings with respect to vaccination, we believe
these ￿ndings shows that our results cannot be driven by some simple implicit modernization
thesis along the lines that coercion and ballot stu¢ ng are lower in relatively prosperous
places.
In Table 5 we introduce our new explanatory variables, which we only have available for
Cundinamarca. Again in panel A our measure of ballot stu¢ ng is the dependent variable.
The ￿ndings here are very robust across speci￿cations. In column 1 we see that the land gini
is negatively correlated with ballot stu¢ ng, with a coe¢ cient of ￿0:675 (s.e.=0.203). In the
same column we see that the correlation between political concentration and ballot stu¢ ng
is also negative. In column 1 for example the coe¢ cient on political concentration is -0.467
(s.e.=0.202) and both the estimated coe¢ cient and standard error are very robust as we
change the set of covariates in di⁄erent columns. For instance, in column 4 when the land
gini and political concentration are both introduced the estimated coe¢ cient on political
concentration is -0.44 (s.e.=0.21) and thus still highly signi￿cant.
Panel A therefore suggests that both land inequality and political concentration are
negatively correlated with ballot stu¢ ng.
In panel B we estimate the same model except that the coercion dummy is now the
explanatory variable, and we can now also use our education data (in columns 9 and 10).
There is one very robust ￿nding from these regressions, which is that there is a signi￿cant
negative correlation between political concentration and coercion. Interestingly, column 9
of this panel also suggests that there is a positive signi￿cant correlation between schooling
and coercion. Note also that the presence of the army always has a negative and signi￿cant
e⁄ect on coercion.
Figures 3 and 4 re-examine the relationships in Figures 1 and 2 with data just from
Cundinamarca, where we now use the names of the municipalities since this is reasonably
clear. Both show evidence of the same negative correlation. One might be concerned in
30Figure 3 that this was being driven by BogotÆ, but recall that our regression results are
robust to dropping departmental capitals. Figure 5 depicts the scatterplot between the land
gini and ballot stu¢ ng. Here there is a quite distinct negative relationship. Municipalities on
the Sabana de BogotÆ, the plain surrounding the city where the ￿rst Spanish conquistadors
settled in the early 16th century, such as Mosquera or Sop￿, have high land inequality and
relatively low levels of ballot stu¢ ng. Figure 6 examines political concentration and ballot
stu¢ ng. It is much less clear from this picture that there is any signi￿cant correlation
between the variables.
5.4 Interpretation
Building on Acemoglu et al. (2008) and our earlier observations, there seems to be some
immediate interpretations of these ￿ndings. Though the Colombian state may have been
weak in 1922, where it was present it served to reduce the extent of fraud. Bureaucrats
reduced ballot stu¢ ng, and the army seems to have reduced coercion. As Montoya (1935,
p. 42) argues,
￿It is undeniable that for a long time and under di⁄erent political regimes, the
Colombian government used the armed forces as an instrument for fraud, and that
members of the army were docile and at times eager agents of such condemnable
system; but it is not less evident, to the honor and joy of our Nation, that those
practices have disappeared￿
The role of the church was very di⁄erent however. Even if during the colonial period the
church is often seen as synonymous with the state, this was clearly not true in Colombia in
1922. Our evidence is very consistent with historical work and contemporary sources which
stressed the close relationship between the clergy and the Conservative party. It was the
Conservatives who mostly persecuted the fraud of 1922, and they were helped by clergy
organizing anti-Liberal violence.
The most interesting ￿ndings of this section, however, relate to land inequality and
political concentration. Land inequality and political concentration are negatively correlated
with ballot stu¢ ng. and this is very robust. In addition we found political concentration to
be signi￿cantly negatively correlated with coercion. These ￿ndings can be ￿tted together.
In Cundinamarca landed elites were not competing with the state, as they may have been in
19th century Germany (Ziblatt, 2009) or Chile in the 1950s (Baland and Robinson, 2009).
31Instead, they were substituting for it and in doing so reduced the extent of fraud. This
explains why high land inequality is negatively correlated with ballot stu¢ ng. Finally, our
results of political concentration are easy to understand. As Acemoglu et al. (2008) point
out, places where political concentration was high were peripheral areas where power was
often in the hands of a powerful cacique. These places were hardly involved in national
politics, so as a result one sees little coercion or ballot stu¢ ng. There is an interesting
non-monotonicity here. In Cundinamarca, in places at the core of the department where the
state functioned or landed elites could substitute for it, there was relatively little coercion
and ballot stu¢ ng. Further away, as the grip of the state and elites weakened, ballot stu¢ ng
and coercion increased. Yet in the most distant parts of the department, where caudillos
ruled almost without concern for the state, electoral fraud fell o⁄ because these areas were
disconnected from the partisan rivalries that tore the nation apart.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated electoral corruption in Colombia￿ s 1922 presidential elec-
tions by o⁄ering measures of the presence and extent of ballot stu¢ ng and the incidence
of coercion at the municipality level. Our ￿ndings, summarized above, are quite distinct
from existing studies. For one, our focus is very much on the role of the state. Though
politics in Colombia was highly partisan, our results suggest that by 1922 some element of a
￿ Weberian state￿had emerged in Colombia and that state o¢ cials, particularly in the army,
were focused on reducing, not implementing fraud. The church, on the other hand, played a
signi￿cant role in coercing Liberal voters and keeping them away from the polls. For another,
we found that land inequality is negatively correlated with ballot stu¢ ng. Contrary to other
studies which have found evidence suggesting that landed elites are implicated in fraud, the
data from Colombia suggests the opposite. We argue that this is a consequence of state
weakness. Though the state might have fought against fraud, its ability to do so was highly
limited. Consequently, landed elites in Colombia found it in their interests to substitute for
the state, not undermine it, and as such fought against the chaos and illegality that went
along with electoral fraud.
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind the problems with the data sources that we have
used to draw these conclusions. Though we have real data on recorded vote totals from the
1922 election we had to estimate the franchise because we have no objective information on
32turnout. We believe that this means that our estimates are a lower bound on the extent
of ballot stu¢ ng, but this obviously introduces potential biases into our estimates that are
hard to evaluate because we do not know what in￿ uenced the extent of turnout across
municipalities or the extent to which it might have been correlated with our explanatory
variables. This measure of fraud is complementary to existing measures, which only rely
on accusations of fraud. Indeed, we used accusations ourselves to construct a measure of
electoral coercion. Nevertheless, there seems to be a lot of potential in using the type of
information we used in this paper for examining electoral corruption.
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Antioquia 76,420 47,987 28,403 19,584 11,658 15.3% 821,027
Arauca 425 146 278 -132 10 2.4% 6,070
Atlantico 9,905 4,840 5,064 -224 1,488 15.0% 117,915
Bolivar 49,548 33,650 15,888 17,762 29,207 58.9% 416,561
Boyaca 83,764 61,977 21,747 40,230 39,688 47.4% 590,587
Caldas 50,186 28,610 21,566 7,044 7,104 14.2% 419,697
Caqueta 363 270 93 177 124 34.1% 2,957
Casanare 68 10 58 -48 1 2.1% 1,382
Cauca 23,024 13,644 9,367 4,277 8,416 36.6% 238,071
Choco 7,214 3,467 3,746 -279 2,649 36.7% 61,371
Cundinamarca 117,471 76,634 40,723 35,911 48,517 41.3% 800,439
Guajira 1,460 1,063 397 666 1,407 96.4% 2,908
Huila 13,864 8,830 4,997 3,833 2,513 18.1% 181,202
Magdalena 18,577 11,657 6,918 4,739 7,465 40.2% 186,254
Meta 2,477 1,255 1,221 34 808 32.6% 10,695
Narino 29,843 23,880 5,959 17,921 4,237 14.2% 327,367
Norte de Santander 35,705 26,894 8,804 18,090 17,449 48.9% 222,552
Putumayo 850 660 190 470 414 48.7% 5,009
San Andres y Providencia 566 465 100 365 0 0.0% 5,953
Santander 55,492 37,784 17,699 20,085 23,926 43.1% 439,161
Tolima 39,083 19,019 20,057 -1,038 18,485 47.3% 320,084
Valle 35,547 17,284 18,249 -965 4,440 12.5% 266,371
TOTAL 651,852 420,026 231,524 188,502 230,007 35.3% 5,443,633   
Table 2 
Variable N mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Panel A: Colombia
Electoral Outcomes
Stuffed Ballots/Adult Males 546 0.19 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.36 0.30 0.21 0.29 0.24 0.28
Log of 1+Stuffed Ballots/Adult Males 546 0.15 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.29 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.20
Coercion Dummy 388 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.41 0 0 1 0
Share of population in each category, 1918 
census (in percent)
Clergy 546 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.16
Armed forces 546 0.06 0.35 0.07 0.39 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.39 0.14 0.39
Bureaucracy 546 0.51 0.36 0.55 0.41 0.47 0.29 0.49 0.35 0.55 0.37
Literate 546 28.8 11.9 31.9 12.4 25.7 10.4 28.9 12.0 28.8 12.3
Goes to school* 546 25.4 17.7 27.4 19.7 23.4 15.2 24.9 13.9 27.7 31.9
Vaccined 546 30.8 19.8 33.6 21.2 28.0 17.8 27.7 16.4 29.2 17.9
Date of foundation 530 1740 117 1738 115 1742 120 1747 110 1709 121.8
Panel B: Cundinamarca
Electoral Outcomes
Stuffed Ballts/Adult Males 107 0.30 0.31 0.05 0.05 0.56 0.25 0.34 0.32 0.19 0.24
Log of (1+Stuffed Ballots/Adult Males) 107 0.24 0.23 0.04 0.05 0.43 0.16 0.26 0.23 0.16 0.19
Coercion Dummy 101 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.45 0.13 0.34 0 0 1 0
Economic and Political Inequality
Land Gini (average 1879, 1890) 97 0.65 0.10 0.67 0.09 0.63 0.10 0.64 0.11 0.68 0.07
Political Concentration Index (1875-1895) 105 -0.55 0.10 -0.53 0.10 -0.57 0.09 -0.54 0.09 -0.60 0.08
Share of population in each category, 1918 
census (in percent)
Clergy 107 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.20
Armed Forces 107 0.10 0.59 0.16 0.81 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.65 0.14 0.36
Bureaucracy 107 0.43 0.38 0.49 0.48 0.37 0.23 0.37 0.22 0.52 0.45
Literate 107 26.0 10.1 28.3 11.7 23.6 7.6 24.3 8.9 29.3 12.1
Goes to school* 107 24.6 26.4 27.9 33.8 21.3 15.5 20.7 12.7 37.6 53.1
Vaccined 107 34.8 17.4 37.7 17.1 31.8 17.4 33.6 16.8 39.8 19.9
Date of foundation 107 1672 110 1668 111 1676 109 1685 108 1652 113
Descriptive statistics
All municipalities By level of stuffed ballots By coercion
Low High No coercion  Coercion 
 
Notes: For variable definition and sources, see Data Appendix. Low ballot stuffing if below the median of Stuffed 
Ballots/Adult Males, High otherwise. *Ratio of population attending school to population from 5 to 14 years of 
age, in percent. All other ratios are relative to total population.   
Table 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Clergy -23.54*** -21.22** -20.57** -22.14** -16.74* -17.65*
(5.849) (8.797) (8.425) (9.147) (8.715) (9.244)
Armed forces -1.896 0.549 1.057 0.583 0.714
(3.517) (4.204) (4.822) (4.265) (4.088)
Bureaucracy -4.383** -2.95 -1.165 -3.348 -2.897







Observations 546 546 546 546 546 530 530 546
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18
Clergy 79.17*** 71.82*** 71.45*** 53.09** 66.77*** 70.66*** 66.80*** 71.41***
(20.840) (21.490) (21.980) (26.870) (21.850) (21.720) (22.810) (22.030)
Armed forces 6.969 1.17 -3.073 1.322 1.118 1.06 1.145
(7.886) (4.844) (2.411) (4.693) (4.858) (4.732) (4.824)
Bureaucracy 10.66* 5.666 4.802 5.439 5.599 5.568 5.62











Observations 388 388 388 388 388 376 388 388 388 388
R-squared 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Log of 1+Stuffed Ballots/Adult Males
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Coercion Dummy (=1 if any form of coercion)
Ballot Stuffing, coercion, and state presence in Colombia
 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parenthesis.  Departmental dummies included. Column 6 
excludes departmental capitals. Table 4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Clergy -35.80*** -22.69** -30.76*** -26.59*** -17.97 -11.11
(8.138) (10.760) (11.660) (9.766) (10.890) (13.440)
Armed Forces -3.982*** -2.354 -2.704 -2.74 -1.421
(1.370) (1.925) (1.702) (2.019) (1.961)
Bureaucracy -12.90*** -10.06*** -10.78*** -9.934*** -9.612**







Observations 107 107 107 107 106 107 107 107
R-squared 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.10
Clergy 124.4*** 121.6*** 145.0** 131.5*** 111.9** 118.1*** 103.8** 110.1**
(30.400) (43.150) (67.600) (32.420) (46.130) (41.250) (45.770) (45.570)
Armed Forces 2.095 -3.065 -2.794 -2.693 -3.390* -3.662** -3.888**
(6.040) (1.862) (1.922) (1.945) (2.011) (1.665) (1.936)
Bureaucracy 29.64* 4.042 4.129 6.238 2.766 6.538 1.689











Observations 101 101 101 101 100 101 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Log of 1+Stuffed Ballots/Adult Males
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Coercion Dummy (=1 if any form of coercion)
Ballot Stuffing, coercion, and state presence in Cundinamarca
 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Column 5 excludes Bogotá. Table 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Land gini -0.675*** -0.692*** -0.617*** -0.589*** -0.619*** -0.591*** -0.477*
(0.203) (0.200) (0.209) (0.213) (0.207) (0.216) (0.257)
Political concentration index -0.467** -0.469** -0.440** -0.494** -0.508** -0.492** -0.526**
(0.202) (0.211) (0.205) (0.203) (0.201) (0.208) (0.204)
Clergy -29.28** -24.86* -26.49** -25.01* -16.49
(13.03) (13.57) (13.32) (13.88) (15.75)
Armed Forces -3.071** -2.887* -2.863* -2.413
(1.447) (1.576) (1.675) (1.574)
Bureaucracy -8.980** -8.032** -8.031** -8.372**







Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
R-squared 0.126 0.117 0.131 0.148 0.143 0.148 0.164
Land gini 0.101 0.296 0.200 0.130 0.146 0.153 0.159 0.148 0.0763
(0.303) (0.323) (0.327) (0.339) (0.314) (0.355) (0.365) (0.333) (0.377)
Political concentration index -1.024** -1.232** -1.128** -1.088** -1.093** -1.132** -1.093** -1.003** -1.093**
(0.449) (0.473) (0.481) (0.480) (0.472) (0.534) (0.477) (0.466) (0.484)
Clergy 120.9* 126.9** 131.8** 130.5* 129.1** 117.8* 117.9*
(63.30) (63.18) (62.16) (66.52) (62.46) (64.06) (66.13)
Armed Forces -5.177** -5.796*** -6.166*** -5.677*** -6.088*** -6.314***
(2.108) (1.932) (2.317) (2.094) (1.813) (2.118)
Bureaucracy 10.42 -2.036 -3.579 -1.679 0.878 -3.264











Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
R-squared 0.113 0.087 0.085 0.121 0.121 0.122 0.121 0.161 0.124
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log of 1+ Stuffed Ballots/Adult Males
Panel B. Dependent variable: Coercion Dummy (=1 if any for of coercion)
Ballot stuffing and coercion in Cundinamarca: state presence, and economic and political concentration
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Political concentration Index, 1875-1895
Cundinamarca. Stuffed ballots and political concentration
  
Data Appendix  
(not for publication) 
Variable Description Source
Stuffed Ballots max{0, Total votes-Estimated Franchise}
Total votes Votes cast in each municipality in the 1922 Presidential elections.  Telegrams sent by Consejos Electorales to 
the Gran Consejo Electoral. (National Archive, 
Asuntos Electorales)
Estimated franchise Estimated literate male population over 19 in 1918 multiplied by 1.09. 
This  corresponds to an adjustment for a yearly growth rate of 2% in 
population.
Estimated literate 
male population over 
19 in 1918
Male literacy rate*Male population over 19 years of age 1918 National Census
Male literacy rate Literate male population to total male population ratio. Population 
with unspecified literacy distributed proportionally between the two 
groups. Available at the municipality level except from the 
department of Guajira, where the departmental rate, of 231/10591 
was applied to all municipalities.
1918 National Census
Male population over 
19 years of age
Male population over 19 years of age with population with unspecified 
age distributed proportionally between the two groups
1918 National Census
Coercion Dummy Indicator equals to 1 if there is indication of (i) violence, (ii) intimidation or 
harassment, or  (iii) arms distribution, and zero otherwise.  Details of 
events included in (i)-(iii) below.
violence If the town had reports of violent clashes or violence against civilians. 




If there are reports of authorities or organized Conservatives 
intimidating civilians: incarcerating Liberals, subjecting them to random 
searches and detainment, or other coercive measures to prevent 
Liberal propagandizing or activism. Includes "pedreadas" (throwing 
stones) to Liberal houses or establishments and mob violence. 
arms distribution If there are reports of organized armed Conservatives who are not 
police or army; distribution of arms for these bodies. Activities of 
intimidation by these bodies. 
Variable Sources and Description
Stuffed Ballots
Coercion
Telegrams sent by Consejos Electorales to 
the Gran Consejo Electoral (National Archive, 
Asuntos Electorales), and liberal complaints 
summarized in Los Partidos Políticos en 
Colombia.
  
Land gini in XIXth Century For Cundinamarca only. Average land gini from 1879 and 1890, 
calculated only for rural plots.




For Cundinamarca only. Political concentration for municipality m at time 
t is contructed as the (negative) of the ratio of the number of different 
individuals in power in such place and time to the number of mayor 
appointments. Very low political concentration (-1) indicates as many 
mayors as appointment opportunities, and high levels of concentration 
(close to 0) indicate a low ratio of people in power to number of 
appointments. The index is for the period 1875-1975
Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin, and Robinson 
(2008) from the Diario Oficial de Cundinamarca.
Armed forces proportion Ratio of armed forces agents to total popualtion 1918 National Census
Clerical proportion Ratio of religious ministers to total population 1918 National Census
Bureaucracy proportion Ratio of public employees to total population 1918 National Census
Literacy rate Literate population to total population ratio. Population with unspecified 
literacy distributed proportionally between the two groups. 
1918 National Census
Schooling rate Ratio of population attending school to population from 5 to 14 years of 
age
1918 National Census
Vaccination rate Ratio of vaccined population to total population 1918 National Census
Foundation date Earliest known foundation date of the municipality Bernand and Zambrano (1993)
Departmental dummies Dummies for each department. Excluded departments are those with just 
a few municipalities (Arauca, Caquetá, Casanare, Choco, Guajira, Meta, 
Putumayo, San Andrés y Providencia)
Other variables
Variable Sources and Description continued
 
 